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It’s been hot here this week in Minnesota – record breaking. Across the U.S., 
record high temperatures are outpacing record lows by 6-1. And globally, the first 
nine months of 2010 have been the hottest in human civilization. It’s hot and it 
is going to get hotter. Today’s young people will live through a global warming of 
4 degrees F; and depending on our actions in the next decade, that number could 
stabilize, or rise to 10 or 11 degrees F. 
Those are the underlying facts. But there is a wide gulf between some prominent 
economists and the scientific community on the right response to global warming. 
IPCC chair Rajendra Pachuari argues that we have only a few short years to act 
aggressively, to get on a trajectory to cut heat-trapping emissions 80% by 2050. 
Meanwhile, some economists advocate a “start-slow, ramp-up” policy, that would 
allow emissions to increase by 50% over the same period.
Perhaps nowhere is the contrast between scientists and economists as great as 
in the dueling metaphors governing the impact of high end warming: “Collapse” 
(following Jared Diamond) versus “Reductions in the Rate of Growth” (follow-
ing all standard integrated assessment models in economics, including those of 
Nicholas Stern and the IPCC).
By way of reference, mid-range estimates of business-as-usual warming are 
currently around 4 degrees C. During the last Ice Age, global temperatures were 
only 4.5 degree C colder then they are today. Many climate scientists, I would 
argue, believe that high end warming (> 4 degrees C) will likely impoverish much 
of humanity.
By contrast, economic models calmly integrate this warming of greater than Ice 
Age magnitude, only in the opposite direction, into scenarios assuming continued 
growth, albeit at reduced levels. Sir Nicholas Stern, for example, working on behalf 
of the UK government, provided an integrated estimate of the costs of climate 
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2change, forecasting likely reductions in global output as high as 20% below the 
baseline. This is a big number, justifying immediate and large cuts in emissions 
on a benefit-cost basis.
And yet, even for Stern, that baseline assumes steady economic growth of 1.3% 
per capita, implying that by 2200, people on the planet will be 12 times as wealthy 
as they are today. Ackerman notes that even assuming what Stern characterizes 
as an extreme worst case scenario – a 35% reduction in income below baseline 
– then the world would “only” be 8 times richer in 2200. Similarly, the IPCC’s 
four “marker scenarios” all forecast developing country per capita GDP to equal 
that of industrial countries in 1990, beginning in 2050 (scenario A1B), to out 
beyond 2100 (scenario A2).
Why no collapse? Economists are acutely aware of a powerful history of a cen-
tury and a half of economic growth. Tracing the course of GDP, calamities such 
as the Great Depression, major regional wars, global epidemics like AIDs, or the 
recent burst in the global housing bubble barely put a dent in long run growth. 
The default assumption is that capitalism will march relentlessly on, regardless of 
climate change (or peak oil, or fresh water and top soil shortages). Sidestepping the 
issue of whether continued economic growth enhances welfare, the conventional 
economist’s position seems well-grounded in historical experience.
Against this record, one school of economists – ecological economists – have 
developed a sophisticated neo-Malthusian response: that high population and 
growing affluence mean the future will not be like the past, and that the economics 
of a full planet make continued global economic growth untenable. As a book of 
cautionary tales, Diamond’s Collapse presents lesson after lesson of how resource 
constraints, married with an inadequate policy response, cascaded into political 
crisis and undermined the economic foundations of pre-industrial societies. And 
yet this perspective – a high likelihood of collapse – has not gained much currency 
among mainstream economics. 
Collapse versus slower than business-as-usual growth reflects a paradigmatic dif-
ference between physical science and economics regarding the impact of climate 
change. Even so, among economists, there are some working to close the gap – and 
others seeking to keep it as wide as possible. 
Estimating the Costs of Climate Change
A good way to illustrate the range of opinion is through different economists’ 
estimates of the “social cost of carbon” – the global warming damages arising from 
the emission of an additional ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). Richard Tol and Wil-
3liam Nordhaus, at one end, view economic damages arising from the emission of 
a ton of carbon dioxide to range from the low teens to negative – meaning that 
global warming might actually yield net benefits! (More on this below). Stern, and 
American economists like Frank Ackerman, derive estimates closer to $100 a ton. 
The Nordhaus/Tol $10 tax per ton of carbon dioxide implies an increase in the 
price of gas of about a dime – in other words, don’t worry, be happy. The Stern/
Ackerman view of $100 per ton implies the need for an immediate steep increase 
in the price of gas of $1 to reflect the underlying true social costs. 
The climate debate between scientists, and among different camps of economists, 
is not about the likely physical effects of high end warming. These impacts are 
incorporated into all economic models. Rather, the differences emerge as different 
economists focus on the costs of climate change that their models can measure.
What will the economic impact be of a given temperature increase? Calculat-
ing the social cost of carbon requires projections of the costs incurred by rising 
temperatures to the global economy, projections made over the next 100 years for 
temperatures outside the range of human experience. Impact estimates for a given 
amount of warming vary significantly.
Richard Tol (2008), the original developer of the FUND integrated assessment 
model, points out that:
...cost estimates omit some impacts of climate change; they tend to ignore 
interactions between different impacts, and neglect higher order effects 
on the economy and population; they rely on extrapolation from a few 
detailed case studies; they often impose a changing climate on a static 
society; they use simplistic models of adaptation to climate change; they 
often ignore uncertainties; and they use controversial valuation methods 
and benefit transfers.
To illustrate this complexity, compare the baseline cost estimates for the United 
States for one of the major integrated assessment models, DICE, developed by 
economist William Nordhaus (2008) at Yale, with an alternate set of estimates 
recommended by University of California – Berkeley economist Michael Hane-
mann. Hanemann (2010) provides a category-by-category critique of Nordhaus, 
and recommends increasing the DICE baseline estimates by a factor of 4. The 
figures reported here are for a 4.5°C warming above 1990 levels.
4This comparison begs many questions, and is used here primarily to illustrate 
that Nordhaus’s DICE model is conservative in many of its underlying assump-
tions about climate change impacts when compared with the Hanemann model. 
Excluding the category of “Extreme and Catastrophic Events” (measured as annual 
national willingness to pay for insurance against the possibility of catastrophic 
events such as rapid sea level rise). Nordhaus’s net overall annual U.S. cost estimate 
is $1 billion – smaller than a rounding error in today’s $14 trillion U.S. economy.
Part of the reason for this low estimated cost is that Nordhaus assumes large 
recreational and amenity benefits ($26 billion) from warmer weather; for example, 
more good golf days. Beyond that, his cost estimates by category are all in the 
low billions of dollars. Given that western U.S. water supplies are expected to 
be dramatically impacted by declining snowpack, Nordhaus’s assertion of a zero 
dollar figure for that category is surprising. Given likewise that a 4.5°C warming 
is anticipated to drive 20–30 percent of the species on the planet into extinc-
tion, including via accelerated acidification of oceans, the figure of $9 billion for 
ecosystems and human settlements combined also seems low (IPCC, 2007). The 
disparity between Nordhaus’s and Hanemann’s estimates provides a sense of the 
challenge economists face in estimating the impacts of future climate change.
Uncertainty in the temperature-damage function is natural, because we do not 
fully understand the physical changes to the planet that will result from a given 
temperature increase. Consider for example the two estimates in Table 1 for sea-
level rise costs: $6 versus $25 billion. Plausible estimates of sea-level rise during 
this century – due to thermal expansion of seawater, melting of temperate glaciers, 





Sea Level $9 $53
Non-Market Impacts
Health, Water Quality, Human Life $3 $15
Human Amenity, Recreation, Leisure -$26 $-8
Human Settlements and Ecosystems $9 $17
Extreme and Catastrophic Events $38 $38
Total $39 $161
Excluding Extreme and Catastrophic $1 $123 
Table 1. Annual US Economic Impacts of a 2.5˚C Warming, in $2008 Billions. Sources: 
Nordhaus, 2008 and Hanemann, 2010.
5and the potential collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets – range 
from a manageable tens of centimeters to a truly devastating two meters (Pfeffer 
et al., 2008).
Serious sectoral analysis of high-end warming impacts are few. One example 
is Nicholls et al. (2008), who explore the case of a 5-meter, 100-year sea-level 
rise resulting from a hypothetical, rapid collapse of the Greenland and/or West 
Antarctic Ice Sheets. Some 400 million people currently live in land that would 
be potentially inundated. Actual inundation and relocation would depend on the 
degree of coastal protection initiated. The authors suggest that coastal protection of 
up to 50% would be justified on a benefit cost basis, reducing actual displacement 
to fewer than 15 million people over 100 years. Now this conclusion is hedged by 
several caveats, most prominently, that in some countries the costs of protection 
would rise prohibitively, to above 1% of GDP, and that Katrina (and add the BP 
blowout) show that optimal defensive investments are seldom made. Nevertheless, 
the paper has a startling bottom-line that is very, very far from collapse: a five-meter, 
rapid sea level rise might imply displacement of only 150,000 people per year, on 
average. Nothing worse here then your average earthquake year.
To sum up: economic analyses that model marginal changes have a hard time 
grappling with the economics of disaster. That said, academic economists neverthe-
less have waded in, and do tend to be aware of the limitations of their modeling 
exercises, providing appropriate caveats in the text. But those caveats often disappear 
from the bottom line policy purposes to which such studies are put. Thus we get 
the projections of continued future economic growth from the IPCC, and Stern.
Beyond trying to assess and price the actual physical damages – some mitigated 
through adaptation – that humans will face in a hotter world, economic estimates 
of the social cost of carbon also are highly sensitive to the analyst’s choice of the 
discount rate used in their models. 
Discounting the costs of climate change
Briefly, economists generally measure future benefits and costs in present value 
terms, as the amount of money that would have to be invested today at the going 
rate of return to generate a comparable cost or benefit in the future. Discounting 
is integral to decision-making in a cost-benefit framework, but is problematic 
over long-time horizons.
In the case of global warming, the argument for discounting is as follows. Prevent-
ing impacts from CO2 emissions – for example by building a sea-wall or investing 
in solar energy – bears an opportunity cost. The incremental dollars spent on sea 
6walls or solar panels might have built a school or financed research and development 
in new pharmaceuticals. Discounting future climate costs insures that society does 
not over-invest today in stabilizing the climate, but instead weighs those invest-
ments equally with other investments of potential benefit to future generations.
The argument for discounting is most persuasive when analyzing the benefits and 
costs of projects with a time-horizon occurring within a single investor’s lifetime, 
such as a 30-year mortgage. However, a ton of CO2 released today will continue 
to impose economic costs for at least 100 years. Discounting truly does “discount” 
costs that are incurred in the future. Costs of $100 that occur at the end of this 
century are reduced to a present value of $40.90 at a discount rate of 1 percent, 
$7.00 at 3 percent, and only $1.20 at 5 percent.
For short-time horizon cost assessments, discount rates of 3 to 5 percent are 
reasonable; they often reflect the foregone opportunity costs of investing dollars 
in one area and not another. When discounting at 5 percent, however, a logic 
that tells us not to spend $1.20 today to prevent, in 90 years, $100 in economic 
costs to our descendants is troubling to most people, including many economists. 
Discount rates that rise above 3 percent result in analyses that dramatically reduce 
the present value of any costs to people or the planet beyond a 30 to 40 year time 
horizon, largely excluding climate impacts on future generations from the cost-
benefit calculus.
Lack of intergenerational equity may be the best-known and most intuitive 
criticism of the use of high discount rates for long-time horizon analyses. This 
concern has been reinforced by numerous economic studies focusing on a number 
of other technical issues. Given these problems, the U.S. EPA (2008) concludes:
A review of the literature indicates that rates of three percent or lower are 
more consistent with conditions associated with long-run uncertainty in 
economic growth and interest rates, inter-generational considerations, and 
the risk of high impact climate damages (which could reduce or reverse 
economic growth).
In spite of the many persuasive arguments against the use of high discount rates, 
Tol and Nordhaus continue to advocate for the use of 5% discount rates. And in 
fact, in Tol’s FUND Model, the use of a 5% rate typically results in a estimate of 
the social cost of carbon of less than zero – implying that global warming will yield 
positive net benefits to human society from business-as-usual global warming, i.e., 
around 3°C over current temperatures by 2100.
This rather surprising result emerges because FUND assumes large positive 
7impacts from mild global warming in the early years, that are later overwhelmed 
by economic costs as the earth’s atmosphere continues to warm up. However, at 
the 5 percent discount rate, the later impacts and costs are more than offset by the 
early benefits, leading the model to conclude that humans are better off, on net, 
with business-as-usual global warming. DICE has a similar structure with large 
initial benefits. In its latest iteration, however, the model finds that at a 5 percent 
discount rate business-as-usual global warming has positive, but very small, net 
costs. What are these up-front benefits?
As noted above, DICE assumes large amenity and leisure benefits from the early 
stages of warming – for example, people will have longer fall and spring seasons 
for outdoor recreation. FUND includes an assumption that on net, a reduction in 
cold-related deaths will greatly outweigh an increase in heat-related deaths. FUND’s 
designer, Richard Tol (2008), and co-authors have argued that a 1°C increase in 
the global mean temperature would save, on net, more than 800,000 lives a year 
by 2050. Both models also assume that agriculture will initially benefit from CO2 
fertilization and longer growing seasons, before eventually experiencing net costs.
DICE assumes that human enjoyment of the weather is maximized at a year-
round average temperature of 20°C. As Ackerman et al. (2009b) note: “. . . this 
is roughly the temperature of Houston or New Orleans, cities where anyone who 
can afford it uses air conditioning for most of the year; it is well above the current 
global average temperature of about 14.5°C.” Redhanz and Madison (2005) find 
that outside of the most northern countries, there will be few amenity benefits 
from even the first few decades of warming.
Regarding the health benefit estimates in FUND, Ackerman and Stanton (2008) 
demonstrate that their existence depends on the questionable assumption that 
humans would not adapt to local temperature changes. Finally, the magnitude 
of alleged agricultural benefits has been challenged by Schenkler et al. (2005), 
Hanneman (2010), and others. 
This debate over whether or not large benefits from global warming exist in 
the short-term brings us back to the difficulty of specifying temperature-damage 
functions and provides yet another example of the perverse impacts of high dis-
count rates.
Even assuming that the amenity, health and short-term agricultural benefits 
identified by Nordhaus and Tol are real, the 5 percent discount rate clearly 
privileges these short-term net benefits enjoyed by the current generation, as the 
planet warms slightly, over longer term net costs imposed on our grandchildren 
8and generations to follow, as the earth heats up dramatically. The result is a model 
outcome arguing the counterintuitive case that unchecked global warming will, 
on balance, benefit humanity. 
To sum up: deriving a social cost of carbon is a horrendously assumption-laden 
exercise, both in terms of guessing the many sectoral costs of climate change 
across a whole range of potential temperature increases, and then in choosing the 
discount rate.
That said, and staying within the dominant economic framework that assumes 
continued global economic growth, it is nevertheless possible to argue a strong 
economic case for sharp near-term reductions in global warming pollution, with a 
goal of stabilizing at a 2 degree C warming. Economic models that assume contin-
ued growth – but also, low discount rates, high business-as-usual emissions, high 
climate sensitivity, and a high temperature damage function – generate estimates 
for the social cost of carbon of greater than $100 per ton, consistent with strategies 
that force a near term peak in global CO2 emissions and support cuts in carbon 
of 80% by mid-century. 
Collapse, Growth and Insurance
Is there a role for actual collapse in economic modeling? Harvard’s Martin 
Weitzman provides a useful metaphor for high-end warming (>4 degrees C): it 
will leave humanity inhabiting “a terra incognita biosphere.” In an unrecognizable 
bio-physical world, continued global economic growth is possible – it is hubris to 
categorically assert otherwise– but Diamond-like catastrophic outcome would also 
seem to have uncomfortably high probabilities, especially for regional economies.
Science suggests that high-end warming does have this kind of probability under 
business-as-usual pollution – well into the double digits. Under these circumstances, 
rather than think about the optimal amount of pollution as determined by the 
“right” carbon price, it is better to consider investments in climate stability as a 
form of insurance. 
If growth continues, this insurance will be quite cheap: colleagues and I have 
shown that very aggressive climate policy, targeting CO2 levels of 350 ppm by the 
end of the century, would likely divert about 3% of GDP per year from consumption 
to investment. In a world economy growing on a per capita basis at 1.3% per year, 
that would mean our descendants in 2075 could inherit a clean energy economy 
and a stable climate, but have to wait two and a half years, until the middle of 
2077 to be as rich otherwise as they would have been on a dirty energy trajectory. 
9If climate catastrophes do emerge under business-as-usual – reversing growth in 
some regions or perhaps globally – then, of course, this insurance investment in 
the form of a world rewired with clean energy, would pay off in spades.
When climate scientists venture into policy, it is often with reference to the 
biblical hell and high-water that high-end warming will unleash: floods, droughts, 
famine, fire, plague, mass extinction. Will economic growth continue through 
these turmoils? Here is where economists and scientists differ. But even if there is 
a 90% chance that growth continues, and a 10% chance of collapse, the standard 
economic answer would be: buy insurance to reduce the odds of catastrophe. In 
turn, the underlying assumption of long run growth makes that insurance quite 
affordable. Bottom line: by balancing the risks of economic collapse against the 
powerful engine of global growth, insurance investments in climate security can 
reconcile economic and scientific perspectives on climate change. 
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